# Are Humans Rational? (Singularly So!)

## General Orientation

The Aristotelian dictum that we are rational animals is under severe attack these days. In fact, the previous sentence may be to seriously understate the situation: the dictum is perhaps outright rejected by many, if not most. From psychologists of reasoning and decision-making to behavioral economists to the “new atheists” (all groups whose message we will consider in this class), the onslaught is firmly underway, and fierce. Yet this course revolves around a defense of the proposition that Aristotle, modernized along Leibnizian, Piagetian, and Bringsjordian $$\times$$ 2 lines, is right. This proposition, put a bit more precisely, is:

• $$\mathcal{R}$$

Humans, at least neurobiologically normal adult ones, are fundamentally rational, where rationality is constituted by certain logico-mathematically based reasoning and decision-making in response to real-world stimuli, including stimuli given in the form of focused tests; but mere animals are not fundamentally rational, since, contra Darwin, their minds are fundamentally qualitatively inferior to the human mind. As to whether computing machines/robots are fundamentally rational, the answer is “No.” For starters, if $$x$$ can’t read, write, and create, $$x$$ can’t be rational; computing machines/robots can neither read nor write nor create; ergo, they aren’t fundamentally rational. But the news for non-human animals and computing machines/robots gets much worse, for they have not the slightest chance when they are measured against $$\mathcal{H}$$, which runs as follows:

• $$\mathcal{H}$$

Humans have the ability to gain knowledge by reasoning (e.g., deductively) quantificationally and recursively over abstract concepts, including abstract concepts of a highly expressive, including infinitary, nature, expressed in arbitrarily complex natural and formal languages.

• Rapid Example

For a rapid (finitary) example (provided long ago on Amtrak to Selmer by Professor Yingrui Yang, who relayed it from Professor Johnson-Laird) of some of the stimuli to which $$\mathcal{R}$$ refers:

• Amtrak-to-Princeton J-L Problem

Suppose that the following two statements are true:

1. Everyone likes anyone who likes someone.
2. Abigail likes Bruno.

• Notice: ‘Fundamentally’

Notice that the adverb ‘fundamentally’ is used repeatedly in $$\mathcal{R}$$. This means, among other things, that humans are \emph{potentially} rational. What humans need in order to reason and make decisions in the relevant ways, we (i.e., SB & AB) further claim, is sustained study of the relevant logic and mathematics, and an ability to use what one has studied in order to reason and decide correctly in response to the aforementioned stimuli. In the course of our defense, we’re going to supply at least some of the relevant logic and mathematics to you. Hence, as you receive and judge our case, we believe that you will move some distance from being merely fundamentally rational to being presently rational. We believe it’s fair to say that the purpose of college is to markedly increase the level of reasoning and decision-making power that constitutes being presently rational.

• Context: A Research University

• A Disclaimer!

Please note that guest lecturers other than A Bringsjord should not be assumed to have affirmed anything like the claims $$\mathcal{R}$$ and $$\mathcal{H}$$ issued above. This thus applies specifically to, in the 2019 edition of AHR?, TA xxxx xxxx, Mike Giancola, and any other guest researchers from the RAIR Lab who visit us to speak/demo. It also applies to those who have helped in the past editions; e.g. Dan Arista, Professors John Milanese and John Licato, Thomas Carter, Atriya Sen, etc. As to what these thinkers hold in connection with $$\mathcal{R}$$, that is an open question. You are free to inquire.

• Graduate Teaching Assistants; Further Help

The TA for the F2019 edition course is: Can Mekik; email address: can.mekik@gmail.com. Can will hold office hours in the Cognitive Architecture Lab (41 9th St, Floor 1; aka EMPAC Annex; requires card access; ring bell/knock on front window to get in), on Thurdays from 1pm to 3pm, and by appointment. Additional assistance will be provided by RAIR-Lab researcher and PhD student Mike Giancola, who specializes in some of the topics discussed in the course (e.g. AIs that can rationally handle inconsistencies arising in real-life scenarios).

• Prerequisites

There are no formal prerequisites. However, this course covers parts of such things as formal deductive logic, formal probabilistic logic, game theory, etc. This implies that — for want of a better phrase — students are expected to have a degree of mathematical maturity. At RPI, this expectation is quite reasonable.

To be a bit more specific, the logico-mathematics alluded to in claims $$\mathcal{R}$$ and $$\mathcal{H}$$ can be partitioned into three general areas: analysis and continuous mathematics (A1); deductive formalisms, systems, and techniques (A2); and inductive/statistical/probabilistic formalisms, systems, and techniques (A3). Because of the nature of RPI’s requirements for a BS, A1 is generally already covered in other classes (on the integral and differential calculus). The emphasis in the present class is on (introductory elements of) areas A2 and A3.

In-class lectures deliver crucial content. (Assuming that things go according to plan, all lectures will be recorded, and will be available for review to all students.) Attendance is required and note-taking is key. Sometimes slides will be distributed by email. Most readings will be electronic, and either distributed by email, or can be obtained by url. As a first example, students should read Nicholson Baker’s “The Wrong Answer” asap, since it (we claim) represents a stark example of an implicit denial of both $$\mathcal{R}$$ and $$\mathcal{H}$$. As to books, it’s required that students purchase and read Kahneman’s (2013) Thinking, Fast and Slow. It’s recommended that students read the available-online The Nature of Rationality by Robert Nozick; S Bringsjord will be drawing from this book at times (in ways that will be announced clearly). Finally, five class meetings will each draw directly from a chapter in S Bringsjord’s forthcoming G\"{o}del’s Great Theorems, from Oxford University Press.

## Footnotes:

1

Sosa, E. (1999) “Are Humans Rational?” in Cognition, Agency and Rationality, K. Korta, E. Sosa, \& X. Arrazola, eds., (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer), pp. 1–8. This book is the Proceedings of the Fifth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science.

Created: 2019-12-10 Tue 14:03

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