What is Knowledge Representation and Reasoning?

What is knowledge representation and reasoning (KR&R)? Alas, a thorough account would require a book, or at least a dedicated, full-length paper, but here we shall have to make do with something simpler. Since most readers are likely to have an intuitive grasp of the essence of KR&R, our simple account should suffice. The interesting thing is that this simple account itself makes reference to some of the foundational distinctions in the field of philosophy. These distinctions also play a central role in artificial intelligence (AI) and computer science.

To begin with, the first distinction in KR&R is that we identify knowledge with knowledge that such-and-such holds (possibly to a degree), rather than knowing how. If you ask an expert tennis player how he manages to serve a ball at 130 miles per hour on his first serve, and then serve a safer, topspin serve on his second should the first be out, you may well receive a confession that, if truth be told, this athlete can’t really tell you. He just does it; he does something he has been doing since his youth. Yet, there is no denying that he knows how to serve. In contrast, the knowledge in KR&R must be expressible in declarative statements. For example, our tennis player knows that if his first serve lands outside the service box, it’s not in play. He thus knows a proposition, conditional in form. It is this brand of declarative statement that KR&R is concerned with.

At some point earlier, our tennis player did not know the rules of tennis. Suppose that for his first lesson, this person walked out onto a tennis court for the first time in his life, but that he had previously glimpsed some tennis being played on television. We can thus imagine that before the first lesson began, our student believed that a serving player in tennis is allowed three chances to serve the ball legally. This belief would have of course been incorrect, as only two chances are
permitted. Nonetheless, this would be a case of a second attitude directed toward a proposition. The first attitude was knowledge, the second mere belief.

Knowledge-based systems (KBSs), then, can be viewed as computational systems whose actions through time are a function of what they know and believe. Knowing that his first serve has landed outside the service box on the other side of the net from him, our (educated) tennis player performs the action of serving for a second time, and as such performs as a KBS. A fully general and formal account of KBSs can be found elsewhere. There are numerous algorithms designed to compute the functions in question, but in the present essay we shall be able to rest content with reference to but a few of them.

The Nature of Philosophy-less KR&R

In this section, after introducing the basic machinery of elementary extensional and intensional logic for purposes of KR&R carried out in the service of building KBSs, we present our characterization of the dividing line between philosophy-less KR&R versus philosophy-infused KR&R.

Overview of Elementary Extensional and Intensional Logic for KR&R

Propositions can be represented as formulas in formal languages. For example, in the present case, we might use a simple formula from the formal language $\mathcal{L}_{PC}$ of the propositional calculus, which allows propositions to be expressed as either specific propositional variables such as $p_1, p_2, \ldots$ (or mnemonic replacements thereof, e.g. $h$ for $p_2$ when we want to represent the proposition that John is happy), or as formulas built from the $p_i$ and the familiar Boolean connectives: $\neg \varphi$ ('not $\varphi$'), $\varphi \lor \psi$ ('$\varphi$ or $\psi$'), $\varphi \land \psi$ ('$\varphi$ and $\psi$'), $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ ('if $\varphi$ then $\psi$'), $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ ('$\varphi$ if and only if $\psi$'). For example, letting $out$ represent the proposition that the ball lands outside the service box, and $play$ that the ball is in play, $out \rightarrow \neg play$ represents the above conditional. If a knowledge-based system knows $out$ and this conditional, it would of course be able to infer $\neg play$, that the ball is not in play. Its reasoning would be deductive in nature, using the well-known rule of inference modus ponens. To use the standard provability relation $\vdash_X$ in knowledge-based/logic-based AI and cognitive science, where the subscript $X$ is a placeholder for some particular proof calculus, we would write

$\{out, out \rightarrow \neg play\} \vdash_X \neg play$

to express the fact that the ball's being out of play can be proved from the formulas to the left of $\vdash$. So here we have a (painfully!) simple case of a KBS, powered by KR&R in action.
Some discussion concerning candidate proof calculi for $X$ is necessary. Due to lack of space, we must leave aside specification of each of the myriad possibilities, in favor of a streamlined approach. This approach is based upon the incontestable fact that there clearly is a generic conception of fairly careful deductive reasoning according to which some lines of linear, step-by-step inference can be accepted as establishing their conclusions with the force of proof, even though detailed definition of particular calculus $X$, and use thereof, is absent. This streamlined approach works because the step-by-step sequence is such that each step from some set \{$p_1, \ldots, p_n$\} to some inferred-to formula $\gamma$ can be quickly seen, with a small amount of mental energy, to be such that it is impossible that each $p_i$ hold, while $\gamma$ does not. What follows is an example of such a sequence, couched in natural language; the sequence establishes with the force of proof that 'Everyone likes anyone who likes someone' and 'Albert likes Brian' it can be inferred that 'Everyone likes Brian'. (Most people see that it can be inferred from this pair of statements that 'Everyone likes Albert', but are initially surprised that 'Everyone likes Brian' can be derived in a bit of a recursive twist.)

1. Everyone likes anyone who loves someone. assumption
2. Albert likes Brian. assumption
3. Albert likes someone. from 2
4. Everyone likes Albert. from 1, 3
5. Brian likes Albert. from 4
6. Brian likes someone. from 5
7. Everyone likes Brian. from 1, 6

Despite opting for what we have called a streamlined approach to provability in the present essay, we would be remiss if we failed to point out that the format that best coincides with how professionals in those fields based on deductive reasoning actually construct proofs and disproofs is clearly something quite like 'Fitch-style' natural deduction, with which many readers will be acquainted. In this kind of 'proof' calculus, which aligns with the deductions written in relevant professional books and papers (in computer science, mathematics, logic, etc.), each of the truth-functional connectives, and the quantifiers (see below), has a pair of corresponding inference rules. One for introducing the connective, and one for eliminating the connective. One concrete possibility for a natural-deduction calculus is the 'human-friendly' one known as $\text{Fitch}$? Another possibility is the natural-deduction-style proof calculus used in the Athena system. We make use of the Athena system below, but don't use or specify its proof calculus.

The propositional calculus is rather inexpressive. Most of what we know cannot be represented in $\Sigma_{pc}$ without an unacceptably large loss of information. For example, from the statement 'Albert likes Brian', we can infer that 'Albert likes someone'. We might attempt to represent these two statements, respectively,
In $\mathcal{L}_{PC}$ as, say, $A$ and $A_{\text{someone}}$. Unfortunately, this representation is defective, for the simple reason that by no acceptable rule of deductive inference can $A_{\text{someone}}$ be deduced from $A$. The problem is that $\mathcal{L}_{PC}$ cannot express quantification in formulas such as 'Albert likes someone', and so lacks inference rules such as existential introduction (which formally obtains the intuitive result above). The machinery of quantification (in one simple form), and this particular rule of inference, are part of first-order logic, whose formal language is $\mathcal{L}_{FOL}$. The alphabet for this language reflects an increase over that for the propositional calculus, to include:

- **identity**: the identity or equality symbol; 
- **connectives**: $\neg, \vee, ...$ now familiar to you, same as in $\mathcal{L}_{PC}$; 
- **variables**: $x, y, ...$ variables ranging over objects; 
- **constants**: $c, c, y, ...$ you can think of these as proper names for objects; 
- **relations**: $R, G, ...$ used to denote properties, e.g., $W$ for being a widow; 
- **functions**: $f_1, f_2, ...$ used to refer to functions; 
- **quantifiers**: $\exists, \forall$ $\exists$ says 'for some ...', $\forall$ says 'for every ...'.

Predictable formation rules are introduced to allow one to represent propositions like the 'Everyone likes anyone who likes someone' one above. In the interests of space, the grammar in the question is omitted, and we simply show 'in action' the kind of formulas that can be produced by this grammar, by referring back to the Albert-Brian example. We do so by presenting here the English-based sequence from above in which natural language is replaced by suitable formulas from $\mathcal{L}_{FOL}$. Recall that this sequence, in keeping with the streamlined approach to presenting provability herein, is something that qualifies as an outright proof. In addition, the reader should rest assured that automated theorem proving technology of today can instantly find a proof of line 7 from lines 1 and 2:

1. $\forall x \forall y ((\exists z \text{ Likes } (x,z)) \rightarrow \text{ Likes } (y,x))$ assumption
2. $\text{ Likes } (a, b)$ assumption
3. $\exists x \text{ Likes } (a, x)$ from 2
4. $\forall x \text{ Likes } (x, a)$ from 1, 3
5. $\text{ Likes } (b, a)$ from 4
6. $\exists x \text{ Likes } (b, x)$ from 5
7. $\forall x \text{ Likes } (x, b)$ from 1, 6

Recall that we referred above to natural-deduction proof calculi, in which each connective and quantifier is associated with a pair of inference rules, one for introducing and one for eliminating. Were this calculus to be applied to the sequence immediately above, the rule of inference for eliminating the universal quantifier would sanction moving from

$$\forall x \forall y ((\exists x \text{ Likes } (x, z)) \rightarrow \text{ Likes } (y, x))$$
to the following – where \( a \) is substituted for \( x \):

\[
\forall y \left( \exists z \, \text{Likes}(a,z) \rightarrow \text{Likes}(y,a) \right)
\]

The reader is invited to see how other such rules can be used to construct a fully formal proof out of the sequence, with help from the works cited above.

There are languages for knowledge representation that fall between \( \mathcal{L}_{PC} \) and \( \mathcal{L}_{FOL} \), and for the most part these are the languages that anchor the brand of KR&R supporting the Semantic Web.\(^{11} \) These languages are more expressive than \( \mathcal{L}_{PC} \), the language of the propositional calculus, but less expressive than the language \( \mathcal{L}_{FOL} \) of first-order logic. And these languages are associated with their own proof calculi. These languages are generally those associated with description logics.\(^{12} \) We don't have the space needed for a full exposition of such logics, but fortunately they can in general be quickly characterized with reference to the ingredients that compose the propositional calculus and first-order logic. We shall refer to these logics as point-\( k \) logical systems. A particular system in the class will be named later when \( k \) is set to some natural number. The ins and outs of how the natural numbers work as indices is based on an idiosyncratic but straightforward table invented for ease of reference by Bringsjord to keep straight decidability theorems for the main logical systems standardly discussed in such contexts.\(^{13} \) Using this table, here is what pins down point-two (i.e. point-\( k \) where \( k = 2 \)) logic:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{None} & \text{Monadic relations} & \text{Dyadic relations} & \text{Triadic relations} \\
\text{One} & \bullet & \text{Dyadic relations} & \text{Triadic relations} \\
\text{Unlimited} & \bullet & \bullet & \bullet
\end{array}
\]

The characterization of such systems is simple. To produce such logics, we simply begin by restricting the alphabet of \( \mathcal{L}_{FOL} \) in various ways. As an example, we might insist that no triadic relation be allowed, that no dyadic relations be allowed, but that any number of monadic relations be allowed (as in the permutation shown in the table immediately above). The logical system with such a language (the language \( \mathcal{L}_{MFOL} \) is point-two logic, or monadic first-order logic. Point-two logic will be otherwise just like FOL. A triadic relation is one that allows a relationship between three objects to be expressed. For example, the relation \((B, \text{Pet's say})\) of a natural number \( n \) being between two distinct natural numbers \( m \) and \( j \) is a triadic one; and here would be a truth regarding the natural numbers that involves this triadic relation:

\[
\forall x \forall y \forall z \left( B(x, y, z) \rightarrow x \neq z \right)
\]

This truth cannot be expressed in monadic FOL. Naturally, dyadic relations would range over two objects, and monadic relations over but one object.
Why would those logical systems between the propositional calculus and full first-order logic be so central to KR&R? The reason point-$k$ logical systems are interesting and useful pertains to an aspect of logical systems that we have yet to discuss: namely, meta-properties of such systems. Important meta-properties of such systems include the meta-property of decidability. A logic system is decidable just in case there is an algorithm for determining whether a formula is a theorem. Of course, assuming the Church-Turing thesis is true, the existence of such an algorithm guarantees that there is a computer program that can determine, given a formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{FO}_k}$, whether $\phi$ is a theorem. While the propositional calculus is decidable, the predicate calculus is not. However, point-two logic is decidable. From the standpoint of KR&R, this is thought by many to be quite desirable. The reason is clear, namely that queries against knowledge bases populated by formulas expressed in $\mathcal{L}_{\text{FO}_k}$ can always (eventually) be answered, that is, where $\mathcal{D}$ is such a knowledge base, queries of the form

$$\Phi \vdash \phi$$

can, given enough time and working memory, always be answered by a standard computing machine.

A fact that beginner students of KR&R and logic often find quite surprising is that the moment even one dyadic relation is allowed into a logic otherwise like FOL, that logic becomes undecidable; the proofs are actually quite simple. However, if one allows another dimension of parameterization into the picture namely the number of quantifiers allowed in formulas, one can allow an expansion on the relation side and yet still preserve decidability, as long as $k$ is quite small. We must leave such details aside.

The final point that must be made in this section is that there are many, many (actually, an infinite number of) logical systems more expressive than first-order logic. We mention just two examples. The first is in the space of extensional logics, the second in the space of intensional logics.

The first example is second-order logic (SOL), which allows quantification over functions and relations, a phenomenon that routinely occurs in natural language. The formal language in question, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{SOL}}$, includes variables for functions and relations. For instance, it seems quite plausible not only that if John is the very same thing as the father of Bill, John and the father of Bill either both have or both lack the property of being obese, but more generally that these two entities are such that every relation is one they share or lack. The general principle operative would be that two things are one and the same just in case every attribute is one they either share or lack; this principle is known as Leibniz's Law. In SOL, we can formalize this law as:

$$(LL) \forall x \forall y (x = y \leftrightarrow \forall X (Xx \leftrightarrow Xy))$$
Note that in (LL) the variable $X$ ranges over relations, whereas $x$ and $y$ range over individual objects in the domain. Humans find it easy enough to discuss scenarios in which attributes themselves have properties, but we leave aside third-order logic and beyond.

Our second example is a simple epistemic logic, in which, to the propositional calculus, we add an operator $K$ for 'knows', which allows us to represent such propositions as that Albert knows that Brian knows that $p$ is the case, as follows,

$$K_xK_y p$$

from which we can deduce, using an axiom that is standard in such logics (namely, that if an agent knows $\phi$, $\phi$ is true), that in fact Brian knows that $p$. A recent exploration of the applicability KR&R is based on advanced epistemic logic.15

We have now reached the point at which we can discuss the dividing line between philosophy-less and philosophy-infused KR&R.


The idea for a dividing line is really quite straightforward: KR&R can be productively pursued, and KBSs built, in the complete absence of philosophy — but only as long as the information represented and reasoned over is not in the realm of the formal sciences, nor in the realm of everyday sophisticated human socio-cognition. On the other hand, philosophy will need to be part and parcel of KR&R when that which is to be represented and reasoned over involves these realms. We can put this position in the form of a claim that makes reference to the expressiveness of formal languages of the sort canvassed above:

Claim C (Regarding the Relationship Between Philosophy and KR&R):

KR&R that represents propositional content in formulas of a formal language less expressive than that used in full first-order logic ($\mathbb{FOL}$) is unable to represent and reason over propositions containing concepts routinely used in the formal sciences, and in everyday human socio-cognition, and as such, such KR&R will have no need for the field of philosophy. Moreover, to engineer KBSs able to represent and reason over the more demanding phenomena in these domains will require a contribution from philosophy, and will specifically require:

1. formulas in $\mathbb{FOL}$ that, once rewritten so that all quantifiers appear in a leftmost sequence in such formulas (i.e. once rewritten in prenex normal form16), are irreducibly populated by at least five non-vacuous quantifiers, must be allowed; and
2. formulas in formal languages that are more expressive than $\mathbb{FOL}$ must be allowed.
We turn now to concretizing this claim by discussing some challenges KR&R can meet only if both philosophy and the associated languages are employed.

The Need for Philosophy

If C is true, then it should be easy enough to see the need for philosophy and the associated representation and reasoning schemes by considering some examples from the relevant domains, and we turn to such consideration now. We first look at an example from the formal sciences, and then one from socio-cognition. In both cases, the KR&R in question has been pursued, and is in fact currently still underway, in our own laboratory.

KR&R and the Formal Sciences

KR&R allows for, indeed in large measure exists to enable, the issuing of queries against knowledge-bases. As such, there is clearly a vantage point from which to see the applicability of KR&R within the formal sciences, that is, within such fields as formal logic, game theory, probability theory, the various subfields of mathematics (e.g. number theory and topology), and so on. In fact, the part of formal logic known as mathematical logic, aptly and (given our present purposes) conveniently provides this vantage point, as we now explain, in brief. After this presentation, we explain why the above conjecture's claim about the formal sciences seems to be quite plausible.

The first step is to view activity in the formal sciences from the standpoint of theories. By 'theory' here is meant something purely formal, not anything like, say, the 'theory' of evolution, which is usually disturbingly informal. In the formal sense, a theory $\mathcal{T}$ is a set of formulas deducible from a set of axioms $\Phi$; more precisely, given $\Phi$, the corresponding theory $\mathcal{T}$ is

$$\{ \varphi \in \mathcal{L} : \Phi \vdash \varphi \}$$

We say in this case that $\Phi$ are the axioms of the theory. Note that there is a background formal language $\mathcal{L}$ from which the relevant formulas are drawn.

But why might it be reasonable to regard all research in the formal sciences to revolve around theories? We don't have the space to fully articulate and defend this view, and hence rest content to convey the basic idea, which is straightforward. That idea is this: work in a formal science $S$ can be idealized as the attempt to ascertain whether or not propositions of interest follow deductively from a core set of axioms for $S$; that is, whether these propositions of interest are indeed part of the theory that arises from the axioms for $S$. In this scheme, probability theory, game theory, mathematics, and so on each consists in the attempt to increasingly pin down the theory determined by the core axioms in question.
For an example simple enough to present here, let's consider a fragment of mathematics, namely, elementary arithmetic. Specifically, we consider the theory of arithmetic known as 'Peano Arithmetic,' or simply as $\text{PA}$.\(^9\) The axioms of $\text{PA}$ are the sentences 1–6 (where $s$ is the successor function, and the other symbols are interpreted in keeping with grade-school arithmetic; e.g. $\times$ is ordinary multiplication), and any sentence in the universal closure of the Induction Schema, 7.\(^{20}\)

1. $\forall x (0 \neq s(x))$
2. $\forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y)$
3. $\forall x (x + 0 = x)$
4. $\forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y))$
5. $\forall x (x \times 0 = 0)$
6. $\forall x \forall y (x \times s(y) = (x \times y) + x)$
7. $\varphi(0) \land \forall x (\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(s(x))) \rightarrow \forall x \varphi(x)$

Given this machinery, the part of mathematics known as arithmetic can be viewed as an attempt to increasingly pin down $\neg \mathcal{A}$. And now it should be clear, in turn, why r&F can be regarded as having direct applicability. One reason is that $\text{PA}$ can be thought of as a knowledge-base, and the attempt to make more and more progress figuring out what is and isn't in the theory $\mathcal{A}$ can be viewed as the attempt to ascertain whether or not, for various formulae generable from the language of arithmetic, say $\varphi$,

$$\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$$

We could thus view 'progress in the field of arithmetic' to be the answer to questions such as whether or not it's true that 29 plus 0 equals 29, and whether or not it's true that 3,000 times 0 equals 0, and so on.

Why, in light of the foregoing and other material, is the claim $\mathcal{C}$ plausible? The answer, put non-technically, is quite straightforward; and comes in three parts, to wit:

- Courtesy of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, we know that there are truths about arithmetic that cannot be proved from $\text{PA}$.\(^{21}\)
- Thanks to additional formal work, we know that some of these truths can nonetheless be proved.\(^{22}\) Let's call this set $\mathcal{G}$.
- The general nature of the representation and reasoning needed to establish the truths in $\mathcal{G}$ is an open question in KR&R and philosophy, but it is clear that full first-order logic is required (for the simple reason that formulas in $\mathcal{G}$ require $\mathcal{L}_{\text{FOL}}$ to be expressed).

So here we have an ongoing investigation in the intersection of the formal sciences and KR&R that both intersects with philosophy, and is consistent with claim $\mathcal{C}$. 

\(^9\) For our purposes, we'll assume the axioms of $\text{PA}$ are the sentences 1–6 (where $s$ is the successor function, and the other symbols are interpreted in keeping with grade-school arithmetic; e.g. $\times$ is ordinary multiplication), and any sentence in the universal closure of the Induction Schema, 7.

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KR&R and Socio-Cognition

We now give our second example of KR&R in action by considering a specific concept in the sphere of socio-cognition. The concept is mendacity. We shall show that careful KR&R in this area necessitates both philosophy, and very expressive formal languages for knowledge representation.

Mendacity

We introduce the topic of mendacity in connection with KR&R by asking you to consider a confessedly idealized scenario. The scenario involves a superficial and implausible concept of lying, but as a warm-up to the genuine article, we indicate how the machinery of unsophisticated KR&R can be brought to bear to provide a solution to the scenario. Afterward, we present a philosophically inspired, plausible definition of lying and demonstrate how a sophisticated, philosophically informed, KR&R system can be used to distinguish lies and liars from honesty and the honest. Without further prelude, we ask you to consider the following scenario: you have been sent to the war-torn and faction-plagued planet of Raq. Your mission is to broker peace between the warring Larpal and Tarsal factions.

In a pre-trip briefing, you were informed that the Larpals are sending one delegate to the negotiations, and the Tarsals are sending a pair. You were also warned that Larpals are liars, i.e. whatever they say is false, while Tarsals are not, i.e. whatever they say is true. Upon arrival, you are met by the three alien delegates. Suddenly, you realize that though the aliens know whom among them are Larpals, and whom are Tarsals, you do not. So, you ask the first alien, 'To which faction do you belong?' In response, the first alien murmurs something you can't decipher. Seeing your look of puzzlement, the second alien says to you, 'It said that it was a Larpal.' Then, with a cautionary wave of an appendage and an accusatory glance at the second alien, the third alien says to you, 'That was a lie!'

Whom among the three aliens can you trust?

Resolution of the Larpals and Tarsals scenario, at least in its present form, requires no more sophistication than propositional and reasoning therewith. The scenario is recast into $L_{PC}$ by, say, representing the three aliens with three constants, their factional membership (Larpal or Tarsal) as mutually exclusive properties, and their assertions as conditional formulas. In Figure 10.1, we show the scenario thus represented, and automatically solved, in Athena, a KR&R system based on multi-sorted, first-order logic, and integrated with both the Vampire theorem prover and the Paradox model finder. The solution to this scenario, expressed in English, is as follows: the second alien is either a Larpal or a Tarsal. If it is a Tarsal, then truly the first alien said that it was a Larpal. Yet, if the first alien said that it was a Larpal, then it told the truth because a Tarsal would not lie and say it was a Larpal, but in so telling the truth, the first alien has distinguished itself as a
Tarsal — a contradiction! Ergo, the second alien cannot be a Tarsal; it is a Larpal. Therefore, the first and third aliens are Tarsals, and thus trustworthy.

Though the Larpals and Tarsals scenario nicely illustrates unsophisticated KR&R in action, the fact of the matter is that the concept of lying used in the scenario is, as we have already indicated, simple-minded. In real life, the idea that liars' propositional claims are always materially false is, well, silly. We might reserve such phrases as habitual liar or pathological liar for such beings, but in the real world, even pathological liars sometimes assert true propositions, if only by accident. Likewise, it is utterly unrealistic to expect honest agents to be infallible, i.e. to expect that their assertions are always materially true, because honest agents, nevertheless, may state false propositions out of ignorance, or error in belief.

To say that an agent is a liar presupposes that one has at hand an account of what it is to lie — yet no such account was set out, let alone included in the knowledge-base constructed above for the Larpals and Tarsals scenario. Any reasonable account of lying must include not just what an agent does — the actus reus of lying — but also what the agent believes and intends. Mendacity and less egregious forms of deception are consummate only when an agent acts with the mens rea to deceive, i.e. when an agent acts intending others to hold beliefs...
that are contrary to what the agent believes to be true. To illustrate, assume that Amy is asked in geography class to name the state capital of California. Amy, erroneously believing that Los Angeles is the capital of California, answers with Los Angeles. Though Amy's answer is materially false, we would not ordinarily accuse Amy of lying because she has answered faithfully according to her belief — her statement was truthfully made, though it was not factually true. However, had Amy known that Sacramento is the capital of California, but answered Los Angeles intending to give a false impression of at least her own mind, then, indeed, she would have been lying. Now assume that Bob is helping Carl, a fugitive, flee from the police. The two agree that Carl should begin a new life in Canada, and then part ways. Later, when the police question Bob about Carl’s whereabouts, Bob, intending to misdirect the police, tells them that Carl has gone to Mexico. Yet unbeknownst to Bob, Carl has changed his mind (and destination), moving to Mexico instead of Canada. Thus, Bob's statement to the police is materially true, though we would normally say that Bob lied because he believed that what he said was false, and said it intending to deceive — though factually true, his statement was falsely made. As these examples illustrate, the mens rea for lying and deception depends on the relationship between an agent's beliefs and the beliefs the agent intends for others.

Now, drawing upon philosophy, we set out a plausible definition of lying. We present this definition first informally, and then formally, using the language of a logical system, namely the socio-cognitive calculus (SCC). Once lying is thus defined, we explain, by revisiting the Larpals and Tarsals scenario, how a highly sophisticated KR&R system can prove, say, that an agent is a liar, or that one agent has lied to another.

Philosophy has a long tradition of contemplating the nature of mendacity and positing definitions thereof (a tradition going back at least to St Augustine). For exposition, we adopt Chisholm's account of lying — a seminal work in the study of mendacity and deception. Using L and D to represent correspondingly the speaker (i.e. the liar) and the hearer (i.e. the would-be deceived), we paraphrase below definitions of lying and the supporting act of asserting.

\[ L \text{ lies to } D = \exists p \text{ such that (i) } L \text{ believes that } p \text{ is not true or } L \text{ believes that } p \text{ is false and (ii) } L \text{ asserts } p \text{ to } D \]  

\[ L \text{ asserts } p \text{ to } D = L \text{ states } p \text{ to } D \text{ and does so under conditions which, he believes, justify } D \text{ in believing that he, } L, \text{ accepts } p \]

Chisholm and Feehan's conception of lying is that of promise breaking. Assertions, unlike non-solemn (e.g. ironic, humorous or playful) statements, proffer an implicit social concord: one that offers to reveal to the hearer the mind of the speaker. In truthful, forthright communication, the speaker fulfills the promise and obligation of this concord. In lying, the speaker proffers the concord in bad faith: the speaker does not intend to, and does not, fulfill the
obligation to reveal his/her true mind, but instead reveals a pretense of belief. In this way, lying 'is essentially a breach of faith'.

The above is, of course, a highly condensed presentation of work, and there are various nuanced philosophical facets to it. Yet, even in condensed form, it is evident that the concepts of lying and asserting depend on agents' temporally coupled beliefs and actions. Thus, formal definition of these concepts requires the use of highly expressive languages for KR&R: ones that can represent, and allow reasoning over, the beliefs and actions of agents through time.

To formally define lying and asserting, we employ the socio-cognitive calculus (SCC). The SCC is a KR&R system for representing, and reasoning over, events and causation, and perceptual, doxastic and epistemic states (it integrates ideas from the event calculus and multi-agent epistemic logic). The SCC is an extension to the Athena system, providing, among other things, operators for perception, belief, knowledge and common knowledge. The signature and grammar of the SCC is shown following. Since some readers may not be familiar with the concept of a signature, we note that it is simply a set of announcements about the categories of objects that will be involved, and about the functions that will be used to talk about these objects. Thus it will be noted that in Figure 10.2, the signature in question includes the specific announcements that one category includes agents, and that happens is a function that maps a pair composed of an event and a moment, and returns true or false (depending upon whether the event does or does not occur at the moment in question).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sorts} & \quad S ::= & \text{Object} \mid \text{Agent} \mid \text{ActionType} \mid \text{Action} \mid \text{Event} \mid \text{Fluent} \mid \text{Modern} \mid \text{Boolean} \\
& & \text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action} \\
& & \text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& & \text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& & \text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
\text{Functions} & \quad f ::= & \text{dipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& & \text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& & \text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& & \text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
\text{Terms} & \quad t ::= & x : S \mid c : S \{t_1, \ldots, t_n\} \\
& & t : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg P \mid P \land Q \mid P \rightarrow Q \mid P \leftrightarrow Q \mid \forall x. P \\
\text{Propositions} & \quad P ::= & \exists s. P \mid S(a, P) \mid K(a, P) \mid B(a, P) \mid C(P)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 10.2: Example of the socio-cognitive calculus.
Reasoning in the SCC is realized via natural-deduction-style inference rules. For instance, $R_2$ shows that knowledge entails belief; $R_1$ infers from 'P is common knowledge' that, for any agents $a_1$, $a_2$ and $a_3$, $a_4$ knows that $a_2$ knows that $a_3$ knows that $P$. And $R_4$ guarantees the veracity of knowledge; that is, if an agent 'knows that $P$', then $P$ is, in fact, the case.

\[
\frac{C(K(a, P) \rightarrow B(a, P))}{R_2} \quad \frac{C(P)}{R_3} \quad \frac{K(a_1, K(a_2, K(a_3, P)))}{P} \quad R_4
\]

In the SCC, agent actions are modelled as types of events. We model lying, asserting, and stating propositions as types of actions that an agent may perform. These action types are denoted by the functions lies, asserts and states. The argument to such action types are conceived of as reified propositions, specifically fluents. Thus, the formula happens(action(l, states(p, d)), m) is read, 'it happens at moment $m$ that agent $l$ states (reified) proposition $p$ to agent $d$. For convenience, we model that an agent is a liar by using the property liar. The signature for these additions to the SCC is as follows (see Figure 10.3):

\[
\text{states}: \text{Fluent} \times \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Action Type}
\]
\[
\text{asserts}: \text{Fluent} \times \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Action Type}
\]
\[
\text{lies}: \text{Fluent} \times \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Action Type}
\]
\[
\text{liar}: \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}
\]

Figure 10.3: Signature in the socio-cognitive calculus.

The definitions of liar, lies and asserts are stipulated as common knowledge by axioms (1)-(3).

\[
C(\forall l. \text{liar}(l) \leftrightarrow \exists d, p, m. \text{happens}(\text{action}(l, \text{lies}(p, d)), m))
\]

(1)

\[
C(\forall d, p, m. \text{happens}(\text{action}(l, \text{lies}(p, d)), m) \leftrightarrow B(l, \neg \text{holds}(p, m) \land \text{happens}(\text{action}(l, \text{asserts}(p, d)), m))
\]

(2)

\[
C(\forall d, p, m. \text{happens}(\text{action}(l, \text{asserts}(p, d)), m) \leftrightarrow \text{happens}(\text{action}(l, \text{states}(p, d)), m) \land B(l, B(d, \text{happens}(\text{action}(l, \text{states}(p, d)), m) \rightarrow B(l, \text{holds}(p, m))))
\]

(3)
Now that we have in hand a formal account for lying, we can re-examine the scenario posed earlier. Assuming that Larpals conform to the plausible definition of lying – not that every statement they make is false, but rather that their assertions, at times, misrepresent their beliefs – and that Tarsals conform to a counterpart notion of honesty – that their assertions faithfully reflect their beliefs, which are, however, still fallible – can one determine which aliens are trustworthy Tarsals?

In order to represent the Larpals and Tarsals scenario, we further extend the SCC signature with the functions `alien`, `larpal` and `tarsal` with a number of constants (see Figure 10.4):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Functions} & \quad f ::= \quad \text{alien} : \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& \quad \text{larpal} : \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean} \\
& \quad \text{tarsal} : \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Constants} & \quad c ::= \quad H, A_1, A_2, A_3; \text{Agent} \\
& \quad p_1, p_2, p_3; \text{Fluent} \\
& \quad m_1, m_2, m_3; \text{Moment}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 10.4: Signature extension.

The constants \(A_1, A_2\) and \(A_3\) denote the three distinct aliens, and the constant \(H\) denotes the human. From the scenario we extract several pieces of common knowledge: (i) \(A_1, A_2\) and \(A_3\) are aliens, while \(H\) is not; (ii) Larpals are liars, and Tarsals are not; (iii) every alien is a Larpal or a Tarsal; and (iv) aliens recognize whether other aliens are Larpals or Tarsals. This common knowledge is represented by axioms (4)-(7):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(4)} & \quad C(\text{alien}(A_1) \land \text{alien}(A_2) \land \text{alien}(A_3) \land \lnot \text{alien}(H)) \\
\text{(5)} & \quad C(\forall_{a} (\text{larpal}(a) \rightarrow \text{liar}(a)) \land (\text{tarsal}(a) \rightarrow \lnot \text{liar}(a))) \\
\text{(6)} & \quad C(\forall_a (\text{alien}(a) \rightarrow (\text{larpal}(a) \lor \text{tarsal}(a)))) \\
\text{(7)} & \quad C (\forall_{a_1, a_2} (\text{alien}(a_1) \land \text{alien}(a_2) \rightarrow \\
\left(\text{tarsal}(a_2) \rightarrow K(a_1, \text{tarsal}(a_2))) \land \\
\left(\text{larpal}(a_2) \rightarrow K(a_1, \text{larpal}(a_2))) \right))
\end{align*}
\]

In addition to the above common knowledge, \(H\) knows that there are exactly two Tarsals and one Larpal in the delegation. This knowledge is represented by axiom (8).
The specific interactions in the scenario at hand brings about several more axioms. The first alien's utterance was unclear, but it is common knowledge that, at moment \( m_1 \), it asserted something to \( H \); that something is denoted by the reified proposition \( p_1 \). Similarly, it is common knowledge that, at moment \( m_1 \), the second alien asserted \( p_2 \) to \( H \). Furthermore, it is common knowledge that \( p_2 \) is materially true if and only if the first alien declared itself a Larpal. Finally, it is common knowledge that, at moment \( m_3 \), the third alien asserted \( p_3 \) to \( H \), and that \( p_3 \) is materially true if and only if the second alien's assertion to \( H \) was a lie. These actions, and the truth conditions of the various assertions, are represented by axioms (9)-(13).

\[
\begin{align*}
(K & \left( \text{larpal } (A_1) \leftrightarrow (\text{tarsal } (A_2) \land \text{tarsal } (A_3)) \right) \land \\
& \left( \text{happens(} \text{action(} A_1, \text{asserts(} p_1, H)\text{,} m_1) \right) \\
& \left( \text{holds(} p_2, m_1\right) \leftrightarrow \text{holds(} p_1, m_1) \leftrightarrow \text{larpal } (A_1)\right)) \\
& \left( \text{happens(} \text{action(} A_2, \text{asserts(} p_2, H)\text{,} m_2) \right) \\
& \left( \text{holds(} p_3, m_2\right) \leftrightarrow \text{happens(} \text{action(} A_3, \text{lies(} p_3, H)\text{,} m_3)\right))
\end{align*}
\]

With the Larpals and Tarsals scenario now formalized in SCC, we proceed to sketch how \( H \), given sufficient contemplation, can know that \( A_1 \) and \( A_3 \) are Tarsals, and that \( A_2 \) is a Larpal. Our sketch consists of three parts: (i) we indicate how \( H \) can know that if \( A_2 \) is a Tarsal, then \( A_3 \) is a Larpal; (ii) we indicate how \( H \) can know that if \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal, then \( A_2 \) is a Larpal; (iii) we indicate how \( H \) can know, based on these two conditionals, that \( A_1 \) and \( A_3 \) are Tarsals, and that \( A_2 \) is a Larpal. In the prose elaboration of the three parts, the reasoning is described from \( H \)'s perspective.

First, suppose \( H \) reasons to itself that \( A_2 \) is a Tarsal. Faction membership is apparent to aliens, and so \( A_2 \) also knows that \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal. \( A_2 \) also knows that Tarsals are not liars, and, more specifically, that it does not happen that \( A_2 \) lies to \( H \). Therefore, \( A_2 \) knows that the proposition that it asserted, \( p_2 \), does not hold, i.e. it is materially false. Since \( A_2 \) knows this, it also believes this. Hence, \( A_2 \) was lying when it made its assertion, so it must be a liar, and so not a Tarsal, and thus a Larpal. In this way \( H \) reasons to itself that if \( A_2 \) is a Tarsal, then \( A_2 \) is a Larpal. Here, expressed in the aforementioned 'streamlined' format for describing a proof, is an abbreviated proof that mirrors this description of \( H \)'s reasoning:
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\[ K(H, \text{tarsal}(A_1)) \]
\[ K(H, K(A_2, \text{aliens}(A_3))) \]
\[ K(H, K(A_3, \text{tarsal}(A_1))) \]
\[ K(H, K(A_4, \neg \text{liar}(A_1))) \]

5. \[ K(H, K(\neg \text{happens}(\text{action}(A_2, \text{lies}(p_1.H)), m_2))) \]

\[ K(H, K(\text{tarsal}(A_1))) \]
\[ K(H, \text{liar}(A_1)) \]
\[ K(H, \text{larpal}(A_1)) \]

Next, suppose \( H \) reasons to itself that \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal. Faction membership is apparent to aliens, and so \( A_1 \) knows that \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal. \( A_1 \) also knows that Tarsals are not liars, and, more specifically, that it does not happen that \( A_1 \) lies to \( H \).

Since \( A_1 \) knows that \( A_2 \) asserted \( p_1 \) to \( H \) and \( A_2 \) does not lie, \( A_1 \) knows that it is not the case that \( A_1 \) believes that \( p_1 \) does not hold. Yet, \( A_1 \) also knows \( A_2 \) knows (and thus believes) that \( A_1 \) is not a Larpal. Therefore, \( A_1 \) knows that it is impossible for \( A_2 \) to have asserted that it is a Larpal, for if it did, then it would be a liar. That is to say, \( A_1 \) knows that its own assertion \( p_1 \) does not hold, i.e. it is materially false. Thus, \( A_2 \) lies in asserting \( p_1 \). In this way, \( H \) reasons to itself that if \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal, then \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal, and then \( A_1 \) is like \( A_1 \), a Tarsal. Finally, in this way, \( H \) reasons to itself that if \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal, then \( A_1 \) is the dishonest Larpal.

Last, were it the case \( (H \) reasons to itself) that \( A_1 \) is a Larpal, then \( A_2 \) and \( A_3 \) would be Tarsals, because there is only one Larpal among the three. Yet, if \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal, then \( A_1 \) is a Larpal, which contradicts \( A_2 \) being a Tarsal. Hence, \( A_1 \) is not a Larpal, thus \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal. Since \( A_1 \) is a Tarsal, \( A_1 \) is a Larpal, and then \( A_1 \) is, like \( A_1 \), a Tarsal. Finally, in this way, \( H \) reasons to itself that \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \) are trustworthy Tarsals, and \( A_3 \) is the dishonest Larpal.

Note that in the final part, where \( H \) definitively determines which aliens are trustworthy, \( H \)s reasoning depends on knowing that there are two Tarsals and one Larpal among the three aliens. Without such knowledge, it is impossible for \( H \) to decide who to trust. Alas, in the real world, such knowledge is not likely. Anyone, at least any human, may lie. Furthermore, nefarious plots (e.g. fraud, pyramid schemes, espionage, guerrilla tactics and terrorism) depend on lying and lesser deceptions. Machines may play a role in guarding e.g. free-market consumers, private citizens and sovereign states against such plots, but only if machines are able to comprehend philosophical concepts like mendacity and deception. In
turn, KR&R systems cannot begin to grasp such concepts unless they embrace philosophy, and the formal sophistication that philosophy demands.

Brief Remark on Evil KBSs

In general, there seems to be no reason in principle why KR&R cannot be applied not only to socio-cognitive concepts like mendacity and deception, but also to even richer and more nuanced concepts that incontestably require philosophical analysis in order to be couched in terms precise enough to allow knowledge bases to hold queryable information about them. For instance, one could consider the possibility of engineering a KBS that is capable of betraying someone, or capable, in general, of being evil. It seems quite undeniable that no KR&R expert could engage in such engineering without both engaging philosophy and making use of highly expressive logics.

Engineering for the former case, which did indeed explicitly involve both philosophy and highly expressive formal languages, has already been carried out by Bringsjord. In this work, philosophical analysis was used to gradually craft a definition of the concept of one agent betraying another. This definition was consistent with C.

What about evil? Here the investigation is still in its early stages. The basic process, though, is the same as what we showed in action in connection with mendacity: philosophy is used to build the definition of evil; the definition is formalized in some logical system; knowledge bases describing evil agents are populated; and queries against such knowledge bases are issued and answered, which gives rise to the relevant knowledge-based systems. The interesting thing about this KR&R work is that if, as some have claimed, a truly evil agent is one that harbours outright contradictions in what he or she believes, logical systems able to allow the representation of contradictory information, and the unproblematic reasoning over that information, would be necessary. Such logical systems are highly expressive and would be C-confirming. These systems are known as paraconsistent logics.

‘Visual’ KR&R and the Future

Heretofore, when representing propositional content, the field of KR&R has been exclusively linguistic in nature. This is consistent with the fact that, to this point in the present essay, all formal languages used for the representation of propositional content have been exclusively linguistic: Well-formed formulas generable by the alphabets and grammars of these languages are invariably strings of characters, and these strings in no way ‘directly resemble’ that which they are intended to denote. For example, when we spoke earlier of liars and truth-tellers, and used names to refer to them in our case studies of mendacity, we
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specifically used the constant 'A' to refer to one of the aliens. Had we felt like doing so, we could just as easily have used instead the constant 'A99', or 'a1' or 'A-33', and so on, ad infinitum. In contrast, a diagrammatic representation of the alien in question would bear a resemblance relation to him, and even slight changes in the diagram could prevent it from denoting the alien. As the philosopher Peirce put it, 'a diagram is naturally analogous to the thing represented.'

Despite the fact that KR&R has traditionally left aside pictorial representation schemes, there can be no disputing the fact that human reasoning is powerful in no small part because it is often diagrammatic in nature. Ironically, while KR&R, as elegantly explained by Glymour, has been purely linguistic since the first formal language for KR&R was introduced by Aristotle (namely, the theory of the syllogism), Aristotle, along with his linguistic-oriented successors in the modern era (e.g. Boole and Frege), sought to explain how the highly visual activity of the great Euclid could be formalized via some logical system. It is plausible to hold, as we do, that substantive parts of this long-sought explanation began to arrive on the scene courtesy of seminal work carried out by a pair of co-collaborating logician/philosophers: Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy.

Since the space we have to discuss diagrammatic KR&R is quite limited, we shall briefly explain, by way of a problem posed by this pair, how a hybrid diagrammatic/linguistic formal language in the so-called Vivid family of such languages can be used to solve this problem. The problem is a seating puzzle given in Barwise and Etchemendy.

Here is the seating puzzle, which has become something of a classic: Five people - A, B, C, D, E - are to seated in a row of seats, under the following three constraints.

C1 A and C must flank E.
C2 C must be closer to the middle seat than B.
C3 B and D must be seated next to each other.

Now, three problems are to be solved:

P1 Prove that E cannot be in the middle, or on either end.
P2 Can it be determined who must be sitting in the middle seat?
P3 Can it be determined who is to be seated on the two ends?

The class of relevant diagrams in this case can conveniently be viewed as a quintuple, each member of which is either one of the five people, or the question mark. For example, here is a diagram:

\[ AECBD \]

Note that this diagram satisfies all three constraints. As another example, the diagram

\[ ??A? \]

is one in which A is seated in the middle chair.
We are now in position to consider a proof that constitutes a solution to the puzzle. This proof will be heterogeneous: it will make use of propositional content expressed in traditional form (i.e., in the form of formulas from the kind of formal languages presented and employed above), and it will make use of such content expressed in the form of diagrams. Since none of the formal languages seen above (e.g., $L_{Per}$, $L_{For}$, etc.) allow for diagrams as well-formed expressions, this proof cannot be based in the logical systems visited above. Here is the proof:

Proof. Given that $E$ must be between $A$ and $C$, there are six diagrams to consider, namely:

$$\begin{align*}
AEC?? & (1) & !AEC?? & (2) & ?AEC?? & (3) \\
CEA?? & (4) & !CEA?? & (5) & ?CEA?? & (6)
\end{align*}$$

However, only (1) and (6) are consistent with the other two constraints. P1 is therefore accomplished. Since in both of these diagrams $C$ is in the middle seat, P2 is answered in the affirmative. As to P3, the answer is 'No', since any end could have one of $A$, $B$ or $D$. QED

The diagrammatic representations seen in this seating puzzle, and in the solution thereof, are frequently used by human reasoners, but have hitherto not been part and parcel of KR&R. Yet, in philosophy, there is a very strong tradition of not only recognizing that such representations are often used, but also of making their use precise in systems that go beyond the purely linguistic. We do not have the space to present and discuss such systems here. We direct the reader to the Vivid system for details on how the seating puzzle, as well as much more complicated representation and reasoning of a visual sort, can be made precise and mechanized.

We conclude this section with a brief remark about the historical context. Logic grew out of philosophy; computer science, and specifically AI, in turn, grew out of logic. This progression is nicely chronicled by Glymour. But we are now in a new progression, one driven by philosophy and logic as midwives, and is gradually expanding KR&R into the visual realm.

Conclusion

We have set out and defended the view that if KR&R is to reach into the realms of mathematics and socio-cognition, then philosophy must become a genuine partner in the enterprise. While we have mentioned a number of phenomena in these realms, we have shown this view in action through a particular emphasis on a concept – mendacity – that by its very nature involves social cognition. We predict that as KR&R expands and matures in the future – if for no other reason than that it should allow humans to work collaboratively with intelligent machines having direct and immediate access to electronic propositional con-
tent about social, cognitive, mathematical and visual matters — philosophy and philosophers will be consulted to an increasingly high degree. If such consultation does not come to pass, and the conjecture above is correct, it follows that KR&R will be limited to propositional content that is but a tiny fragment of what is known by human beings; and it follows in turn from that that intelligent machines, relative to human minds, will, knowledge-wise, remain exceedingly primitive by comparison.