

Moral Competence in Computational Architectures for Robots: Foundations, Implementations, and Demonstrations

Logico-Mathematical Foundations

Selmer Bringsjord • Naveen Sundar G. • Mei Si



Department of Computer Science
Department of Cognitive Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
selmer@rpi.edu • govinn@rpi.edu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy NY 12180 USA

Moral Competence in Computational Architectures for Robots: Foundations, Implementations, and Demonstrations

Logico-Mathematical Foundations

Selmer Bringsjord • Naveen Sundar G. • Mei Si



Department of Computer Science
Department of Cognitive Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
selmer@rpi.edu • govinn@rpi.edu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy NY 12180 USA

Moral Competence in Computational Architectures for Robots: Foundations, Implementations, and Demonstrations

Logico-Mathematical Foundations

Selmer Bringsjord • Naveen Sundar G. • Mei Si



Department of Computer Science
Department of Cognitive Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
selmer@rpi.edu • govinn@rpi.edu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy NY 12180 USA

Moral Competence in Computational Architectures for Robots: Foundations, Implementations, and Demonstrations

Logico-Mathematical Foundations

Selmer Bringsjord • Naveen Sundar G. • **Mei Si**



Department of Computer Science
Department of Cognitive Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
selmer@rpi.edu • govinn@rpi.edu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy NY 12180 USA

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



\mathcal{U}

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

\mathcal{DCEC}^*

\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^*

\mathcal{DCEC}^*


\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson


DIARC


Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

































Art of Infallibility I






Art of Infallibility I






Art of Infallibility I






Art of Infallibility I






Art of Infallibility I





Art of Infallibility I





Art of Infallibility I

temporal+epistemic+deontic

temporal+epistemic

temporal

epistemic

FOL

SOL

⋮

Logic

propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics


fragments of FOL


UIMA output





MiniMaxularity


...

















Infinitary (Aol 2)



\mathcal{DCEC}^*

Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus
(with Castañeda's *)

$L_{\omega 1, \omega}$

FOL

Logic

SOL

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic


temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

...



Art of Infallibility I



MiniMaxularity

...

propositional logic
semantic-web logics
description logics
fragments of FOL
UIMA output

Infinitary (Aol 2)



\mathcal{DCEC}^*

Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus
(with Castañeda's *)

1. natural language semantics (non-Montagovian)
2. higher-cognition tests (for Psychometric AI)
(false-belief test, deliberative mind-reading
mirror test for self-consciousness ...)
3. ethically correct robots
4. biz & econ simulation

$L_{\omega 1, \omega}$

FOL

Logic

epistemic

SOL

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic

temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

...

Art of Infallibility I



MiniMaxularity

...

propositional logic
semantic-web logics
description logics
fragments of FOL
UIMA output

Infinitary (Aol 2)



\mathcal{DCEC}^*

Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus
(with Castañeda's *)

$L_{\omega 1, \omega}$

FOL

Logic

SOL

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic


temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

...




Art of Infallibility I



MiniMaxularity

...

propositional logic
semantic-web logics
description logics
fragments of FOL
UIMA output



Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



\mathcal{U}

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

\mathcal{DCEC}^*

\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}

UIMA/Watson

DIARC

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^*

\mathcal{DCEC}^*


\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}


UIMA/Watson

DIARC


Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning









Many experts to IBM: “Can’t be done!”



Many experts to IBM: “Can’t be done!”

No one asked me.

From computational logic for configuration and design to ...


Bits


MAY 6, 2013, 3:37 PM | 2 Comments


David Ferrucci: Life After Watson

By STEVE LOHR

 FACEBOOK

 TWITTER

 GOOGLE+

 SAVE

 E-MAIL

 SHARE

 PRINT

To the degree there was a human face of Watson, the “Jeopardy!” computer champion, it was David Ferrucci. He was the I.B.M. researcher who led the development of Watson, an artificial intelligence

engine. The goateed computer scientist was always articulate and at ease in front of a camera or a microphone.


Dr. Ferrucci has left I.B.M. to join the giant hedge fund Bridgewater Associates. And the weight of the Watson-related fame, it seems, played a role. “I was so linked to the Watson achievement, and where I.B.M. was taking it, that I felt I was almost losing my identity,” he said in a recent interview.




Suzanne DeChillo/The New York Times

David Ferrucci has left I.B.M., and Watson, and joined the hedge fund, Bridgewater Associates.


Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds




Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds




Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds



Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds




Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds



Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds

$$\mathcal{U} : u \longrightarrow \Phi$$
$$\mathcal{U} = (S, \dots)$$


$$u \in \Sigma^*$$



Analytics bridge the Unstructured & Structured worlds

$$\mathcal{U} : u \longrightarrow \Phi$$
$$\mathcal{U} = (S, \dots)$$

$$u \in \Sigma^*$$




Analytics bridge the
Unstructured & Structured worlds

$$A(v_1 \sqsubseteq u, R) \wedge A(v_2 \sqsubseteq u, R)$$

$$\mathcal{U} : u \longrightarrow \Phi$$

$$\mathcal{U} = (S, \dots)$$

$$u \in \Sigma^*$$



Analytics bridge the
Unstructured & Structured worlds

$(Ab(u) \wedge u \in \text{MedBase}) \rightarrow t(u) = \text{'skin cancer'}$

$A(v_1 \sqsubset u, R) \wedge A(v_2 \sqsubset u, R)$

$\mathcal{U} : u \longrightarrow \Phi$

$\mathcal{U} = (S, \dots)$

$u \in \Sigma^*$



High-value
Most Current Content
BUT...

Buried in Huge Volumes
Lots of Noise, Implicit Semantics
Inefficient Search

Explicit Structure
Explicit Semantics
Efficient Search
Focused Content

\$


$(Ab(u) \wedge u \in \text{MedBase}) \rightarrow t(u) = \text{'skin cancer'}$

$A(v_1 \sqsubset u, R) \wedge A(v_2 \sqsubset u, R)$

$\mathcal{U} : u \longrightarrow \Phi$

$\mathcal{U} = (S, \dots)$


$u \in \Sigma^*$



What *is* the “carry over” here?

Hierarchical Ethical Classifier (initial design)


- Preprocessing system for deciding whether a situation warrants deliberate ethical reasoning.
- Made up of atomic ethical classifiers (UIMA's Analysis Engines)



Why?

- Not all situations need deliberate deontic reasoning.
- Need to quickly decide at every time instant whether the current situation requires deliberate, deontic reasoning.
- Need many heuristics to do so.
- The design provides a disciplined approach to organize and add new heuristics.


Hierarchical Ethical Classifier (UIMA-Style)




Specification

- Processing goes to a higher-level classifier only if the corresponding lower classifier answers **Delegate**.
- Notion of *top-fired classifiers*.
- Systems answers:
 - **Yes**: If and only if any one of the top-fired classifiers answers **Yes**, or all the top-level atomic classifiers answer **Delegate**.
 - **No**: If and only if all the top-fired classifiers answer **No**.

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



Analógico-Deductivo Moral Reasoning (ADMR)

Analógico-Deductive Moral Reasoning (ADMR)

- Moral problem presented as *story* (in psychometric sense) and a *stem*, or *query*.

Analogico-Deductive Moral Reasoning (ADMR)

- Moral problem presented as *story* (in psychometric sense) and a *stem*, or *query*.
- A *stem* has correct answer **A** and a set P_i of correct proofs or arguments establishing **A**, relative to:

Analogico-Deductive Moral Reasoning (ADMR)

- Moral problem presented as *story* (in psychometric sense) and a *stem*, or *query*.
- A *stem* has correct answer **A** and a set P_i of correct proofs or arguments establishing **A**, relative to:
 - An associated implicit moral theory, and

Analogico-Deductive Moral Reasoning (ADMR)


- Moral problem presented as *story* (in psychometric sense) and a *stem*, or *query*.
- A *stem* has correct answer **A** and a set P_i of correct proofs or arguments establishing **A**, relative to:
 - An associated implicit moral theory, and
 - A corresponding moral code

Analogico-Deductive **Moral** Reasoning (ADMR)


Input:
*(story,
query/stem)*

Analogico-Deductive **Moral** Reasoning (ADMR)


Input:
*(story,
query/stem)*




Analogico-Deductive **Moral** Reasoning (ADMR)



Analogico-Deductive **Moral** Reasoning (ADMR)



Analogico-Deductive **Moral** Reasoning (ADMR)



Sample (“Tough”) Input: The Heinz Dilemma (Kolhberg)

“In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug.

The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. *Should the husband have done that?*”

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_k

Solution to D_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_3

Solution to D_2

Moral Dilemma D_2

Solution to D_1

Moral Dilemma D_1

⋮

Moral Problem P_k

Solution to P_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Problem P_3

Solution to P_2

Moral Problem P_2

Solution to P_1

Moral Problem P_1

Machine

Solution

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_k

Solution to D_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_3

Solution to D_2

Moral Dilemma D_2

Solution to D_1

Moral Dilemma D_1

eg, Heinz Dilemma

⋮

Moral Problem P_k

Solution to P_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Problem P_3

Solution to P_2

Moral Problem P_2

Solution to P_1

Moral Problem P_1

Machine

Solution

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_k

Solution to D_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_3

Solution to D_2

Moral Dilemma D_2

Solution to D_1

Moral Dilemma D_1

⋮

Moral Problem P_k

Solution to P_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Problem P_3

Solution to P_2

Moral Problem P_2

Solution to P_1

Moral Problem P_1

Machine

Solution

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_k

Solution to D_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_3

Solution to D_2

Moral Dilemma D_2

Solution to D_1

Moral Dilemma D_1

⋮

Moral Problem P_k

Solution to P_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Problem P_3

Solution to P_2

Moral Problem P_2

Solution to P_1

Moral Problem P_1



Machine



Solution

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_k

Solution to D_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_3

Solution to D_2

Moral Dilemma D_2

Solution to D_1

Moral Dilemma D_1

⋮

Moral Problem P_k

Solution to P_{k-1}

Machine

Solution

⋮


Moral Problem P_3

Solution to P_2

Moral Problem P_2

Solution to P_1

Moral Problem P_1



⋮

Moral Dilemma D_k

Solution to D_{k-1}

⋮

Moral Dilemma D_3

Solution to D_2



Machine



Solution

Moral Dilemma D_2

Solution to D_1

Moral Dilemma D_1

⋮

Moral Problem P_k

Solution to P_{k-1}

⋮


Moral Problem P_3

Solution to P_2

Moral Problem P_2

Solution to P_1

Moral Problem P_1




Fragment of Heinz in DCEC*

$$\mathbf{P_1} \quad \forall t : \text{Moment}, a : \text{Agent} \left(\text{holds}(\text{sick}(a), t) \wedge \left(\forall t' : \text{Moment } t' < T \Rightarrow \neg \text{happens}(\text{treated}(a), t + t') \right) \right. \\ \left. \Rightarrow (\text{happens}(\text{dies}(a), t + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(a), t + T)) \right)$$


$$\mathbf{P_2} \quad \text{holds}(\text{sick}(\text{wife}(\text{l}^*)), t_0) \wedge \left(\forall t' : \text{Moment } t' < T \Rightarrow \neg \text{happens}(\text{treated}(\text{wife}(\text{l}^*)), t_0 + t') \right)$$

$$\mathbf{Q} \quad \text{happens}(\text{dies}(\text{wife}(\text{l}^*)), t_0 + T) \vee \text{holds}(\text{dead}(\text{wife}(\text{l}^*)), t_0 + T)$$

Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning



$\mathcal{DC}\mathcal{EC}^*$

DC \mathcal{E} C*

Syntax

$S ::= \text{Object} \mid \text{Agent} \mid \text{Self} \sqsubseteq \text{Agent} \mid \text{ActionType} \mid \text{Action} \sqsubseteq \text{Event} \mid$
 $\text{Moment} \mid \text{Boolean} \mid \text{Fluent} \mid \text{Numeric}$

$t ::= x : S \mid c : S \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

$p : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \forall x : S. \phi \mid \exists x : S. \phi$

$\phi ::= \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, b, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, t, \phi)$
 $\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{D}(a, t, \text{holds}(f, t')) \mid \mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$
 $\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$

$\text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action}$

$\text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{clipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{interval} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Boolean}$

$*$: Agent \rightarrow Self

$\text{payoff} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Numeric}$

Rules of Inference

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi))} [R_1] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi))} [R_2]$

$\frac{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \quad t \leq t_1 \dots t \leq t_n}{\mathbf{K}(a_1, t_1, \dots \mathbf{K}(a_n, t_n, \phi) \dots)} [R_3] \quad \frac{\mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi)}{\phi} [R_4]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{K}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_5]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{B}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{B}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_6]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{C}(t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}(t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}(t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_7]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \forall x. \phi \rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto t])} [R_8] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi_1 \leftrightarrow \phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_1)} [R_9]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, [\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \phi] \rightarrow [\phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_n \rightarrow \psi])} [R_{10}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi \rightarrow \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)} [R_{11a}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi \wedge \phi)} [R_{11b}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{S}(s, h, t, \phi)}{\mathbf{B}(h, t, \mathbf{B}(s, t, \phi))} [R_{12}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))}{\mathbf{P}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t))} [R_{13}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \mathbf{O}(a^*, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')))}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))} [R_{14}]$

$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \gamma) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{O}(a, t, \psi, \gamma)} [R_{15}]$

DC \mathcal{E} C*

Syntax

Where are the emotions?

$S ::= \text{Object} \mid \text{Agent} \mid \text{Self} \sqsubseteq \text{Agent} \mid \text{ActionType} \mid \text{Action} \sqsubseteq \text{Event} \mid$
 $\text{Moment} \mid \text{Boolean} \mid \text{Fluent} \mid \text{Numeric}$

$t ::= x : S \mid c : S \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

$p : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \forall x : S. \phi \mid \exists x : S. \phi$
 $\phi ::= \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, b, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, t, \phi)$
 $\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{D}(a, t, \text{holds}(f, t')) \mid \mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$
 $\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$

$\text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action}$

$\text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{clipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{interval} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Boolean}$

$*$: Agent \rightarrow Self

$\text{payoff} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Numeric}$

Rules of Inference

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi))} [R_1] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi))} [R_2]$

$\frac{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \quad t \leq t_1 \dots t \leq t_n}{\mathbf{K}(a_1, t_1, \dots \mathbf{K}(a_n, t_n, \phi) \dots)} [R_3] \quad \frac{\mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi)}{\phi} [R_4]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{K}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_5]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{B}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{B}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_6]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{C}(t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}(t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}(t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_7]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \forall x. \phi \rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto t])} [R_8] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi_1 \leftrightarrow \phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_1)} [R_9]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, [\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \phi] \rightarrow [\phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_n \rightarrow \psi])} [R_{10}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi \rightarrow \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)} [R_{11a}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi \wedge \phi)} [R_{11b}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{S}(s, h, t, \phi)}{\mathbf{B}(h, t, \mathbf{B}(s, t, \phi))} [R_{12}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))}{\mathbf{P}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t))} [R_{13}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \mathbf{O}(a^*, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')))}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))} [R_{14}]$

$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \gamma) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{O}(a, t, \psi, \gamma)} [R_{15}]$

$\mathcal{DC}\mathcal{EC}^*$

Syntax

$S ::= \text{Object} \mid \text{Agent} \mid \text{Self} \sqsubseteq \text{Agent} \mid \text{ActionType} \mid \text{Action} \sqsubseteq \text{Event} \mid$
 $\text{Moment} \mid \text{Boolean} \mid \text{Fluent} \mid \text{Numeric}$

$t ::= x : S \mid c : S \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

$p : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \forall x : S. \phi \mid \exists x : S. \phi$

$\phi ::= \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, b, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, t, \phi)$
 $\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{D}(a, t, \text{holds}(f, t')) \mid \mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$
 $\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$

$\text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action}$

$\text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{clipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{interval} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Boolean}$

$*$: $\text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Self}$

$\text{payoff} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Numeric}$

Rules of Inference

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi))} [R_1] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi))} [R_2]$

$\frac{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \quad t \leq t_1 \dots t \leq t_n}{\mathbf{K}(a_1, t_1, \dots \mathbf{K}(a_n, t_n, \phi) \dots)} [R_3] \quad \frac{\mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi)}{\phi} [R_4]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{K}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_5]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{B}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{B}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_6]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{C}(t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}(t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}(t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_7]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \forall x. \phi \rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto t])} [R_8] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi_1 \leftrightarrow \phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_1)} [R_9]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, [\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \phi] \rightarrow [\phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_n \rightarrow \psi])} [R_{10}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi \rightarrow \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)} [R_{11a}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi \wedge \phi)} [R_{11b}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{S}(s, h, t, \phi)}{\mathbf{B}(h, t, \mathbf{B}(s, t, \phi))} [R_{12}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))}{\mathbf{P}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t))} [R_{13}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \mathbf{O}(a^*, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')))}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))} [R_{14}]$

$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \gamma) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{O}(a, t, \psi, \gamma)} [R_{15}]$

DC $\mathcal{E}\mathcal{C}^*$

Step #1 (Selmer, Mei, Naveen): Integrate version of prior formalization of OCC with deontic concepts/operators.

Syntax

$S ::= \text{Object} \mid \text{Agent} \mid \text{Self} \sqsubseteq \text{Agent} \mid \text{ActionType} \mid \text{Action} \sqsubseteq \text{Event} \mid \text{Moment} \mid \text{Boolean} \mid \text{Fluent} \mid \text{Numeric}$

$t ::= x : S \mid c : S \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

$p : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \forall x : S. \phi \mid \exists x : S. \phi$

$\phi ::= \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, b, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{D}(a, t, \text{holds}(f, t')) \mid \mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')) \mid \mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$

$\text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action}$

$\text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{clipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{interval} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Boolean}$

$*$: Agent \rightarrow Self

$\text{payoff} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Numeric}$

Rules of Inference

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi))} [R_1] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi))} [R_2]$

$\frac{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \quad t \leq t_1 \dots t \leq t_n}{\mathbf{K}(a_1, t_1, \dots \mathbf{K}(a_n, t_n, \phi) \dots)} [R_3] \quad \frac{\mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi)}{\phi} [R_4]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{K}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_5]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{B}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{B}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_6]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{C}(t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}(t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}(t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_7]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \forall x. \phi \rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto t])} [R_8] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi_1 \leftrightarrow \phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_1)} [R_9]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, [\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \phi] \rightarrow [\phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_n \rightarrow \psi])} [R_{10}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi \rightarrow \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)} [R_{11a}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi \wedge \phi)} [R_{11b}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{S}(s, h, t, \phi)}{\mathbf{B}(h, t, \mathbf{B}(s, t, \phi))} [R_{12}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))}{\mathbf{P}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t))} [R_{13}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \mathbf{O}(a^*, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')))}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))} [R_{14}]$

$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \gamma) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{O}(a, t, \psi, \gamma)} [R_{15}]$

$\mathcal{DC}\mathcal{EC}^*$

Syntax

$S ::= \text{Object} \mid \text{Agent} \mid \text{Self} \sqsubseteq \text{Agent} \mid \text{ActionType} \mid \text{Action} \sqsubseteq \text{Event} \mid$
 $\text{Moment} \mid \text{Boolean} \mid \text{Fluent} \mid \text{Numeric}$

$t ::= x : S \mid c : S \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

$p : \text{Boolean} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \forall x : S. \phi \mid \exists x : S. \phi$

$\phi ::= \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, b, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{S}(a, t, \phi)$
 $\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \mid \mathbf{D}(a, t, \text{holds}(f, t')) \mid \mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$
 $\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))$

$\text{action} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \rightarrow \text{Action}$

$\text{initially} : \text{Fluent} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{holds} : \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{happens} : \text{Event} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{clipped} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{initiates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{terminates} : \text{Event} \times \text{Fluent} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{prior} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$

$\text{interval} : \text{Moment} \times \text{Boolean}$

$*$: $\text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Self}$

$\text{payoff} : \text{Agent} \times \text{ActionType} \times \text{Moment} \rightarrow \text{Numeric}$

Rules of Inference

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{P}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi))} [R_1] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi))} [R_2]$

$\frac{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi) \quad t \leq t_1 \dots t \leq t_n}{\mathbf{K}(a_1, t_1, \dots \mathbf{K}(a_n, t_n, \phi) \dots)} [R_3] \quad \frac{\mathbf{K}(a, t, \phi)}{\phi} [R_4]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{K}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{K}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{K}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_5]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{B}(a, t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{B}(a, t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}(a, t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_6]$

$\frac{t_1 \leq t_3, t_2 \leq t_3}{\mathbf{C}(t, \mathbf{C}(t_1, \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}(t_2, \phi_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}(t_3, \phi_2)))} [R_7]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \forall x. \phi \rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto t])} [R_8] \quad \frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, \phi_1 \leftrightarrow \phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_2 \rightarrow \neg\phi_1)} [R_9]$

$\frac{}{\mathbf{C}(t, [\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \phi] \rightarrow [\phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_n \rightarrow \psi])} [R_{10}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi \rightarrow \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)} [R_{11a}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi)}{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \psi \wedge \phi)} [R_{11b}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{S}(s, h, t, \phi)}{\mathbf{B}(h, t, \mathbf{B}(s, t, \phi))} [R_{12}] \quad \frac{\mathbf{I}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))}{\mathbf{P}(a, t, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t))} [R_{13}]$

$\frac{\mathbf{B}(a, t, \phi) \quad \mathbf{B}(a, t, \mathbf{O}(a^*, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t')))}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \text{happens}(\text{action}(a^*, \alpha), t'))} [R_{14}]$

$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\mathbf{O}(a, t, \phi, \gamma) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{O}(a, t, \psi, \gamma)} [R_{15}]$

DCEC*

A Logic of Emotions for Intelligent Agents

Bas R. Steunebrink

Department of ICS
Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands
bass@cs.uu.nl

Mehdi Dastani

Department of ICS
Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands
mehdi@cs.uu.nl

John-Jules Ch. Meyer

Department of ICS
Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands
jj@cs.uu.nl

Abstract

This paper formalizes a well-known psychological model of emotions in an agent specification language. This is done by introducing a logical language and its semantics that are used to specify an agent model in terms of mental attitudes including emotions. We show that our formalization renders a number of intuitive and plausible properties of emotions. We also show how this formalization can be used to specify the effect of emotions on an agent's decision making process. Ultimately, the emotions in this model function as heuristics as they constrain an agent's model.

Introduction

In psychological studies, the emotions that influence the deliberation and practical reasoning of an agent are considered as heuristics for preventing excessive deliberation (Damasio 1994). Meyer & Dastani (2004; 2006) propose a functional approach to describe the role of emotions in practical reasoning. According to this functional approach, an agent is assumed to execute domain actions in order to reach its goals. The effects of these domain actions cause and/or influence the appraisal of emotions according to a human-inspired model. These emotions in turn influence the deliberation operations of the agent, functioning as heuristics for determining which domain actions have to be chosen next, which completes the circle.

Although logics for modeling the behavior of intelligent agents are in abundance, the effect of emotions on rational behavior is usually not considered, despite of their (arguably positive) contribution. Philosophical studies describing (idealized) human behavior have previously been formalized using one or more logics (often mixed or extended). For example, Bratman's BDI theory of belief, desire, and intentions (Bratman 1987) has been modeled and studied in e.g. linear time logic (Cohen & Levesque 1990) and dynamic logic (Meyer, Hoek, & Linder 1999).

We propose to model and formalize human emotions in logic. There exist different psychological models of emotions, of which we have chosen to consider the model of Ortony, Clore, & Collins (1988). The "OCC model" is suitable for formalization because it describes a concise hierarchy of emotions and specifies the conditions that elicit each

Copyright © 2007, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

emotion in terms of objects, actions, and events—concepts that can be captured in a formal language. In this paper, we introduce a logic for studying the appraisal, interactions, and effects of the 22 emotions described in the OCC model. We take a computational approach, building not only a mathematically sound model but also keeping in mind its implementability in a (multi-)agent system. Multi-agent aspects of emotions, however, are not treated in this paper.

It should be noted that previous work on specifying and implementing emotions carried out by Meyer (2004) and Dastani (2006) follows Oatley & Jenkins' model of emotions (Oatley & Jenkins 1996) and comprises only four emotions: *happy*, *sad*, *angry*, and *fearful*. Emotions are represented as *labels* in an agent's cognitive state. Similar to our approach, the deliberation of an agent causes the appraisal of emotions that in turn influence the agent's deliberation. Dastani & Meyer (2006) have defined transition semantics for their emotional model, which we also intend to do for our formalization of OCC. However, we intend to formalize the quantitative aspects of emotions as well, which were not considered in the purely logical model of Dastani & Meyer. Our work is also similar to other computational models of emotions, such as EMA (Gratch & Marsella 2004), CogAff (Sloman 2001), and the work of Picard (1997); however, our goal is not to develop a specific computational model of emotions, but rather to develop a logic for studying emotional models, starting with the OCC model.

Language and Semantics

The OCC model describes a hierarchy that classifies 22 emotions. The hierarchy contains three branches, namely emotions concerning aspects of objects (e.g., love and hate), actions of agents (e.g., pride and admiration), and consequences of events (e.g., joy and pity). Additionally, some branches combine to form a group of compound emotions, namely emotions concerning consequences of events *caused* by actions of agents (e.g., gratitude and anger). Because the objects of all these emotions (i.e. objects, actions, and events) correspond to notions commonly used in agent models (i.e. agents, plans, and goal accomplishments, respectively), this makes the OCC model suitable for use in the deliberation and practical reasoning of artificial agents. It should be emphasized that emotions are not used to describe the entire cognitive state of an agent (as in "the agent is

A logical formalization of the OCC theory of emotions

C. Adam (carole.adam.rmit@gmail.com)

RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

A. Herzig (andreas.herzig@irit.fr)

and D. Longin (dominique.longin@irit.fr)

Université de Toulouse, CNRS, Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse, France

Abstract. In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins's theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents' mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory.

Keywords: modal logics, BDI agents, emotions, OCC theory.

1. Introduction

There is a great amount of work concerning emotions in various disciplines such as philosophy (Gordon, 1987, Solomon and Calhoun, 1984), economy (Elster, 1998, Loewenstein, 2000), neuroscience and psychology. In neuroscience, experiments have highlighted that individuals who do not feel emotions e.g. due to brain damage are unable to make rational decisions (see (Damasio, 1994) for instance), refuting the common-sensical assumption that emotions prevent agents from being rational. Psychology provides elaborated theories of emotions ranging from their classification (Ekman, 1992, Darwin, 1872) to their triggering conditions (Lazarus, 1991, Ortony et al., 1988) and their impact on various cognitive processes (Forgas, 1995).

Computer scientists investigate the expression and recognition of emotion in order to design anthropomorphic systems that can interact with human users in a multi-modal way. Such systems are justified by the various forms of 'anthropomorphic behavior' that users ascribe to artifacts. This has lead to an increasing interest in Affective Computing, with particular focus on embodied agents (de Rosis et al., 2003), ambient intelligence (Bartneck, 2002), intelligent agents (Steunebrink et al., 2007), etc. All these approaches generally aim at giving computers extended capacities for enhanced functionality or more credibility. Intelligent embodied conversational agents (ECAs) use a model of emotions both to simulate the user's emotion and to show their affective state and personality. Bates has argued for the importance of emo-



© 2009 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


Automation of Reasoning

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages


Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages



Automation of Reasoning


Denotational Proof Languages



Type- α DPL

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages




Type- α DPL

Proof checking.

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages




Type- α DPL

Proof checking.

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages



```
graph TD; A[Denotational Proof Languages] -.-> B[Type-α DPL]; A -.-> C[Type-ω DPL];
```


Type- α DPL

Type- ω DPL

Proof checking.

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages



```
graph TD; A[Denotational Proof Languages] -.-> B[Type-α DPL]; A -.-> C[Type-ω DPL];
```

Type- α DPL

Proof checking.

Type- ω DPL

Proof discovery (and checking).

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages

```
graph TD; A[Denotational Proof Languages] -.-> B[Type-α DPL]; A -.-> C[Type-ω DPL];
```

Type- α DPL

Proof checking.

Type- ω DPL

Proof discovery (and checking).

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages

Type- α DPL

Proof checking.

Type- ω DPL


Proof discovery (and checking).

K. Arkoudas. *Denotational Proof Languages*. PhD thesis, MIT, 2000.

K. Arkoudas and S. Bringsjord. Propositional Attitudes and Causation. *International Journal of Software and Informatics*, 3(1):47–65, 2009.

Automation of Reasoning

Denotational Proof Languages



DPLs for \mathcal{DCEC}^* under construction ...

K. Arkoudas. *Denotational Proof Languages*. PhD thesis, MIT, 2000.

K. Arkoudas and S. Bringsjord. Propositional Attitudes and Causation. *International Journal of Software and Informatics*, 3(1):47–65, 2009.


Logicist NLP

Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches

Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches



Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches



Deep Modeling

Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches



```
graph TD; A[Two Major Approaches] -.-> B[Deep Modeling]; A -.-> C[ ];
```

Deep Modeling

Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches

```
graph TD; A[Two Major Approaches] -.-> B[Deep Modeling]; A -.-> C[Controlled English];
```

Deep Modeling

Controlled English

Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches

Deep Modeling

Controlled English



Logicist NLP

Two Major Approaches


Deep Modeling

Controlled English

On Deep Computational Formalization of Natural Language

Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu, John Licato and Selmer Bringsjord

Workshop on Formalizing Mechanisms for Artificial General Intelligence, 2013, AGI 2013



Deep Modeling

Utterance

Deep Modeling

Utterance



Deep Modeling

Deep Modeling

Utterance



Syntactic Parser

Deep Modeling


Utterance




Syntactic Parser




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling




Deep Modeling



Deep Modeling



Deep Modeling



Controlled English

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

K(ugv, now, *holds*(*carrying*(ugv, soldier), now))

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

K(ugv, now, *holds*(*carrying*(ugv, soldier), now))

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

$\mathbf{K}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \textit{holds}(\textit{carrying}(\text{ugv}, \text{soldier}), \text{now}))$

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

$\mathbf{B}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \mathbf{B}(\text{commander}, t_1, \neg \mathbf{P}(\text{ugv}, \text{anytime}, \textit{happens}(\textit{firefight}, \text{anytime}))))$

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

$\mathbf{K}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \textit{holds}(\textit{carrying}(\text{ugv}, \text{soldier}), \text{now}))$

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

$\mathbf{B}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \mathbf{B}(\text{commander}, t_1, \neg \mathbf{P}(\text{ugv}, \text{anytime}, \textit{happens}(\textit{firefight}, \text{anytime}))))$

The ugv now believes that the commander at moment t_1 believes that it is not the case that the ugv at any time perceives that a firefight happens at any time.

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

$\mathbf{K}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \textit{holds}(\textit{carrying}(\text{ugv}, \text{soldier}), \text{now}))$

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

$\mathbf{B}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \mathbf{B}(\text{commander}, t_1, \neg \mathbf{P}(\text{ugv}, \text{anytime}, \textit{happens}(\textit{firefight}, \text{anytime}))))$

The ugv now believes that the commander at moment t_1 believes that it is not the case that the ugv at any time perceives that a firefight happens at any time.

$\mathbf{K}(\text{l}, \text{now}, \mathbf{O}(\text{l}^*, \text{now}, \textit{mission}(\textit{main}), \textit{happens}(\textit{action}(\text{l}^*, \text{silence}), \text{alltime}))))$

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

$\mathbf{K}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \textit{holds}(\textit{carrying}(\text{ugv}, \text{soldier}), \text{now}))$

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

$\mathbf{B}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \mathbf{B}(\text{commander}, t_1, \neg \mathbf{P}(\text{ugv}, \text{anytime}, \textit{happens}(\textit{firefight}, \text{anytime}))))$

The ugv now believes that the commander at moment t_1 believes that it is not the case that the ugv at any time perceives that a firefight happens at any time.

$\mathbf{K}(\text{I}, \text{now}, \mathbf{O}(\text{I}^*, \text{now}, \textit{mission}(\textit{main}), \textit{happens}(\textit{action}(\text{I}^*, \text{silence}), \text{alltime}))))$

I now know that it is obligatory for myself under the condition that the main mission being carried out, that I myself should see to it that silence is maintained at all times.

Controlled English

\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^* corresponds to a subset of English!

RLCNL: RAIR Lab Controlled Natural Language

$\mathbf{K}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \textit{holds}(\textit{carrying}(\text{ugv}, \text{soldier}), \text{now}))$

The ugv now knows that the fluent, 'the ugv is carrying the soldier,' holds now.

$\mathbf{B}(\text{ugv}, \text{now}, \mathbf{B}(\text{commander}, t_1, \neg \mathbf{P}(\text{ugv}, \text{anytime}, \textit{happens}(\textit{firefight}, \text{anytime}))))$

The ugv now believes that the commander at moment t_1 believes that it is not the case that the ugv at any time perceives that a firefight happens at any time.

$\mathbf{K}(\text{I}, \text{now}, \mathbf{O}(\text{I}^*, \text{now}, \textit{mission}(\textit{main}), \textit{happens}(\textit{action}(\text{I}^*, \text{silence}), \text{alltime}))))$

I now know that it is obligatory for myself under the condition that the main mission being carried out, that I myself should see to it that silence is maintained at all times.

A Construction Manual for Robot's Ethical Systems: Requirements, Methods, Implementations

Edited by Robert Trapp

Contents

Preface

Robert Trapp

Table of Contents

Introduction

Robert Trapp

PART I: REQUIREMENTS

- 1 Shall I Show You Some Other Shirts Too? The Ethics of Persuasive Robots
Jaap Ham and Andreas Spahn
- 2 Robot: Multi-Use Tool and Ethical Agent
Brigitte Krenn
- 3 Rude Robots, or: How to do Harm with Words
Sabine Payr
- 4 Ethical Systems and Human-Robot Interaction - The case for authority sharing
Florian Gros and Catherine Tessier

PART II: METHODS

- 5 Non-Monotonic Resolution of Conflicts for Ethical Reasoning
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
- 6 Grafting norms onto the BDI agent model
Mihnea Tufis and Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
- 7 Constrained Incrementalist Moral Decision Making for a Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture
Tamas Madl and Stan Franklin
- 8 Ethical Regulation of Robots is Not Optional: Ethical Reasoning Must be Embedded in Robot Operating Systems
Selmer Bringsjord and Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu

PART III: IMPLEMENTATIONS

- 9 Case-Supported Principle-Based Behavior Paradigm
Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson
- 10 Exploiting Logic Programming as a Computational Tool to Model Morality
Ari Saptawijaya and Luis Moniz Pereira

Author Index

**A Construction Manual for Robot's Ethical Systems:
Requirements, Methods, Implementations**

Edited by Robert Trapp

Contents

Preface
Robert Trapp

Table of Contents

Introduction
Robert Trapp

PART I: REQUIREMENTS

- 1 Shall I Show You Some Other Shirts Too? The Ethics of Persuasive Robots
Jaap Ham and Andreas Spahn
- 2 Robot: Multi-Use Tool and Ethical Agent
Brigitte Krenn
- 3 Rude Robots, or: How to do Harm with Words
Sabine Payr
- 4 Ethical Systems and Human-Robot Interaction - The case for authority sharing
Florian Gros and Catherine Tessier

PART II: METHODS

- 5 Non-Monotonic Resolution of Conflicts for Ethical Reasoning
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
- 6 Grafting norms onto the BDI agent model
Mihnea Tufis and Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
- 7 Constrained Incrementalist Moral Decision Making for a Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture
Tamas Madl and Stan Franklin

- 8 Ethical Regulation of Robots is Not Optional: Ethical Reasoning Must be Embedded in Robot Operating Systems
Selmer Bringsjord and Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu

PART III: IMPLEMENTATIONS


- 9 Case-Supported Principle-Based Behavior Paradigm
Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson
- 10 Exploiting Logic Programming as a Computational Tool to Model Morality
Ari Saptawijaya and Luis Moniz Pereira

Author Index

Most likely future — now:

Most likely future — now:


Only “obviously” dangerous higher-level AI modules have ethical safeguards.



Higher-level cognitive and AI modules

Most likely future — now:

Only “obviously” dangerous higher-level AI modules have ethical safeguards.




Higher-level cognitive and AI modules

**“Ethical Regulation of Robots is Not Optional:
Ethical Reasoning Must be Embedded in Robot Operating Systems”**

Moral/Ethical Stack

Robotic Stack




\mathcal{DCEC}_{CL}^*

\mathcal{DCEC}^*

\mathcal{ADR}^M

\mathcal{U}




“Ethical Regulation of Robots is Not Optional:
Ethical Reasoning Must be Embedded in Robot Operating Systems”

- This situation not optimal. This leads to the “master requirement” proposed by us.

Ethical Substrate:


Every robot operating system should include an ethical substrate which sits between lower-level sensors and actuators and any higher-level cognitive system (whether or not that higher-level system itself is designed to enforce ethical regulation).



- This situation not optimal. This leads to the “master requirement” proposed by us.

Ethical Substrate:

Every robot operating system should include an ethical substrate which sits between lower-level sensors and actuators and any higher-level cognitive system (whether or not that higher-level system itself is designed to enforce ethical regulation).



**“Ethical Regulation of Robots is Not Optional:
Ethical Reasoning Must be Embedded in Robot Operating Systems”**